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From Maggie to May: Forty Years of (de)Industrial Strategy 
Abstract 
Upon becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May installed industrial strategy as one of the 
principal planks of her economic policy. May’s embrace of industrial strategy, with its 
tacit acceptance of a positive role for the state in steering and coordinating economic 
activity, initially appears to be a decisive break with an era dating back to Margaret 
Thatcher in which government intervention was regarded as heresy. Whilst there are 
doubtless novel features, this article argues that continuity is the overriding theme of 
May’s industrial strategy. First, despite their reluctance to confess it, like every UK 
government over the past 40 years May is proposing to intervene selectively to ‘pick 
winners’. Moreover, the strategy envisages extending assistance to industries in receipt of 
substantial government resources since the 1970s. Likewise, the backing anticipated for 
industries identified in May’s strategy is dwarfed by those that are not, most notably the 
financial services sector. Far from radically rebalancing the structure of the UK economy 
May’s strategy seems destined to entrench the deindustrialisation with which its 
governments have grappled for almost a century. 
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Introduction  
 2 
Just over a decade ago the run on Northern Rock heralded the start of a financial 
crisis whose baleful consequences continue to convulse the UK. For many citizens, the 
response to the crisis epitomised the unfairness and injustice at the heart of Britain’s 
economic model. The use of public money to bailout and subsidise the profits of 
corporate behemoths in financial services contrasted sharply with the experience of the 
majority of people who bore the brunt of tax rises and spending cuts inflicted in the name 
of austerity. Speaking in September 2017 at an event to mark the tenth anniversary of 
Northern Rock’s collapse Alastair Darling, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, echoed 
the widely held sentiment that the combination of financial crisis and austerity had 
aggravated social and economic marginalisation that found its political expression in the 
referendum decision in favour of leaving the European Union.
1
  
Brexit prompted another bout of hand-wringing amongst the political elite about 
what the state could, or should, do to alleviate the plight of individuals and communities 
left behind by globalisation. Theresa May’s subsequent embrace of industrial policy, with 
its implicit acceptance of a positive role for government in shaping the economy and 
promoting competitive advantage, has been presented as a ‘significant departure’ 
portending the ‘reversal of the previously hands off approach to industrial policy’ over 
the last forty years
2
. 
The May government’s industrial strategy, published as a November 2017 White 
Paper
3
, undoubtedly exhibits some novel features. Nonetheless this article contends that 
this policy shift is less dramatic than it appears. First, the strategy sustains the tension, 
inherent in UK industrial policy throughout the previous four decades between, on the 
one hand, explicitly endorsing free market prescriptions and, on the other, a more implicit 
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recognition of the market’s limit as an agent of social change and innovation. The upshot 
has been a schizophrenic industrial policy which combines habitual appeals to the virtues 
of free markets with selective state intervention to support specific firms and sectors. 
Second, many of the industries singled out for assistance in the latest industrial strategy 
including construction, automobiles and aerospace, have received substantial government 
support since the 1970s. Finally, the strategy is significant for what its fails to 
acknowledge, namely that the anticipated government assistance for manufacturing is 
still dwarfed by that being conferred on other sectors, most notably the financial services 
industry. The new industrial strategy is poised to preserve precisely the kinds of policies 
that have produced the deindustrialisation and the imbalances characteristic of the British 
economic growth model. 
 
 (De)Industrial Strategy - the Thatcher effect 
 
Following the Second World War, industrial strategy was an intrinsic part of the 
post-war consensus and efforts of successive governments to arrest the deindustrialisation 
seen as symptomatic of the UK’s economic decline. The emphasis was upon selective 
industrial policy whose intent is to promote certain industries over others irrespective of 
market signals. Despite these interventions, the growth of manufacturing output lagged 
behind other advanced economies and, in the late 1960s, manufacturing employment 
began to slump. Faced with growing economic turmoil, UK governments of the 1970s 
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significantly expanded the scale and scope of selective industrial intervention but this 
provided little more than rear-guard action against encroaching deindustrialisation. 
Proponents of selective industrial policy maintained that its failure to resurrect 
UK manufacturing derived from its conservatism and lack of coherence. Rather than 
seeking to nurture nascent sources of industrial capability UK industrial policy 
concentrated on cosseting declining sectors and incumbent firms. The increasingly 
assertive apostles of the New Right drew a different conclusion, namely that the travails 
of the UK’s industrial policy were evidence of the cost and futility of government 
attempts to ‘pick winners’. The UK industry’s insulation from market discipline through, 
amongst other things, nationalisation, subsidies and restraints on foreign trade and 
investment, had provoked complacency and blunted its innovative instincts. Commercial 
opportunities, they professed, should be located by entrepreneurs taking risks in response 
to price signals generated by the forces of supply and demand. Whereas bureaucrats may 
be tempted to be profligate with public money the entrepreneur, with their personal 
capital at risk and the profit motive as an incentive, made superior investment decisions. 
Winners would emerge from competition for customers, not government diktat. 
Furthermore industrial policy was also thought to be ‘crowding-out’ private investment 
by absorbing the scarce economic resources entrepreneurs needed to launch more 
efficient and innovative enterprises. In short, industrial strategy was thought to be 
inhibiting the creative destruction so essential to economic vitality. 
Margaret Thatcher made plain her views on the future of manufacturing in a 
speech delivered July 1976. During this address, she declared that ‘manufacturing 
industry is of critical importance to our entire economy’ to the extent that ‘the recovery 
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and sustained expansion of British industry is the most important single task of the next 
Conservative government’.4  She went on to aver that the principle obstacle to a thriving 
UK manufacturing sector was excessive state intervention which, in the words of Keith 
Joseph, had left enterprise ‘over-governed, over-spent, over-taxed, over-borrowed and 
over-manned’.5 The antidote, outlined in a nine-point plan, was a programme of 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that would roll back the frontiers of the state 
thereby unleashing pent up entrepreneurial energy and rolling forward the frontiers of the 
market. Henceforth the state would be confined to implementing functional industrial 
policies that correct market failures and foster the conditions for efficient market 
operations.  
Upon assuming office in 1979 Thatcher was, ostensibly at least, as good as her 
word. The resources devoted to industrial strategy diminished and the blend of sectoral 
and functional policies moved towards the latter. At 1980 prices, spending on national 
industrial assistance slumped from £4.54 billion in 1978/79 to £65 million in 1989/90.
6
 
Dwindling public expenditure on industry steadily drained the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s resources and brought responsibility for industrial policy within the orbit of the 
Treasury’s supply-side economists. An extensive privatisation process curtailed direct 
state control in several key economic sectors such as telecommunications, energy and 
aviation. Instead the Thatcher administrations’ industrial policy stressed the importance 
of strengthening education and workforce skills, flexible labour markets, lower taxes, and 
exposing UK companies to competition from home and abroad through domestic 
deregulation and growing openness to foreign trade and investment. Unfortunately, many 
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firms, already hampered by high interest rates and an overvalued pound, atrophied in the 
ruthless competitive environment unleashed by the free market revolution.  
Far from checking the UK’s industrial decline the policies of the Thatcher 
governments proved an accelerant. Between 1979 and 1990 1.779 million UK 
manufacturing jobs disappeared. Manufacturing output did not return to 1978 levels until 
1988 and continued to fall as a share of UK national income, from 23% in 1980 to 20% 
in 1990.
7
 Finally the balance of trade in goods turned negative in 1983 and has remained 
so ever since.  
The oft repeated allegation that selective industrial strategy in the UK was 
immolated amidst the pyre of interventionist policies ignited by the Thatcher 
administrations is somewhat misleading, however. Thatcher swiftly overcame her 
aversion to industrial policy when confronted by climbing unemployment. Despite an 
almost callous disregard for the fate of vast swathes of manufacturing industry, and 
rhetoric to the contrary, the 1980s Conservative governments continued to ‘pick 
winners’.  
Thatcher’s governments lent ample backing to defence manufactures, 
perpetuating a role played by the British governments throughout the twentieth century. 
As well as touring the globe drumming up sales for Britain’s armaments companies, the 
Thatcher governments authorised a series of deals to underwrite risks and subsidise 
investment in the aerospace industry. British Aerospace was offered loans worth £700m 
to expedite the investments necessary to produce components for the new generation of 
Airbus aeroplanes, most notably the wings for the fabled A380. Meanwhile, Rolls Royce 
received £437 million of ‘launch aid’ part of which endowed investments into the engine 
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which would ultimately power the Airbus A320. When the company was privatised in 
1988 the government sweetened the deal with £283 million of equity capital. The state 
retains a ‘golden share’ in Rolls-Royce that allows it to veto takeover attempts thus 
cushioning the company from shareholder demands to maximise short-term financial 
returns.  
Civilian manufacturing witnessed diminishing government support but it did not 
disappear altogether. Amongst the leading beneficiaries of government largesse was the 
automobile industry. Almost £3bn of public money was ploughed into British Leyland as 
the Thatcher governments sought to break up the company and restructure its balance 
sheet in preparation for privatisation. Simultaneously the state was providing incentives 
to foreign vehicle manufacturers to invest in the UK. As the 2017 industrial strategy 
concedes ‘we successfully rebuilt our automotive industry by deliberately attracting 
investment from abroad’ (emphasis added).8 The sizable investment in production 
facilities by Nissan and later Honda and Toyota understandably hogged the headlines but 
their success paved the way for other Japanese manufacturers to invest in the UK. By the 
end of the decade over 30,000 people were employed by more than one-hundred Japanese 
manufacturing firms.  
Conveniently privatisations and inward foreign direct investment were very 
lucrative for another sector chosen for targeted intervention: the financial services 
industry of the City of London. In accounts of UK deindustrialisation and relative 
economic decline the City of London is regularly cast as one of the chief villains. 
Contrastingly, the Thatcher governments judged financial services to be an industry in 
which the UK could be globally competitive and thus worthy of state support. Besides, 
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the industry seemed to exemplify the go-getting individualist creed the government 
wished to instil elsewhere. Praising the City’s export contribution in 1978 Thatcher 
suggested ‘this was not the achievement of politicians (because) the services provided by 
the City attract no subsidies, no hidden subventions from Government’.9 A 
thoroughgoing programme of liberalisation and deregulation, culminating in the Big 
Bang of 1986, sought to enhance the efficiency of the financial services industry by 
injecting greater foreign competition and ending the segmentation of domestic financial 
markets.  
Taxpayer subsidies for infrastructure investment cemented the City’s ascent. Four 
billion pounds of state support went into the London Docklands Development 
Corporation, which sponsored the emergence of the Canary Wharf financial district. An 
equivalent amount eased transport links to the area by financing the London Dockland 
Light Railway. The biggest subsidy of all however, were the implicit guarantees offered 
by the government to financial institutions in the event of their default. The magnitude of 
these subsidies would be graphically illustrated by the financial crisis of 2008. The City’s 
competitiveness rested not just on the inherent inventiveness possessed by the denizens of 
the Square Mile but on strong and centrally coordinated state intervention. Only ideology 
prevented this being acknowledged as selective industrial policy.  
 
Industrial Policy from Thatcher to May 
 
In the quarter century following Thatcher’s defenestration UK industrial policy exhibited 
remarkable continuity with not even the economic earthquake of 2008 fundamentally 
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disturbing its trajectory. Apart from a brief flirtation with a more activist industrial 
strategy during Michael Heseltine’s stint as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
governments outwardly acquiesced with the new consensus that industrial policy meant 
‘functional’ interventions to augment the business environment. While the Major 
administrations prioritised further deregulation and privatisation the Blair administrations 
accentuated competition as a spur to entrepreneurial innovation and risk-taking.  
Concurrently, however, governments of this period pursued sectoral intervention to 
shelter favoured industries from competitive hardships. Some notable exceptions 
notwithstanding, these interventions saw civilian manufacturing continuing to wither and 
reinforced the service orientation of the UK economy.  
After the 2008 financial crisis came a brief, if belated, recognition of the 
shortcomings of markets and the need to rebalance the sectoral composition of the UK 
economy. Starting with Peter Mandelson the Secretaries of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS) in the Brown and coalition governments pontificated publicly about the 
need for industrial activism. They were joined by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, who popularised the rebalancing narrative in his 2011 ‘march of the 
makers’ speech. This did not profoundly alter industrial policy, however. Under Osborne 
the Treasury clung steadfastly to the usual recipe prosecuting an industrial strategy where 
tax cuts, labour market deregulation and investments in education outweighed assistance 
to struggling manufacturers. Under the coalition government the BIS budget fell by a 
fifth helping the Treasury to safeguard its stranglehold on industrial policymaking. 
During his tenure at the BIS Vince Cable frequently fulminated about the Treasury’s 
frustration of his aspiration to realise a more interventionist agenda.  
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Despite bemoaning their ability to pick winners governments carried on doing so. 
Reflecting their importance not only to national security but also UK industrial capacity 
and competitive advantage governments have advanced support to defence and aerospace 
manufacturers. Between 2012 and 2015 alone the civil aerospace sector pocketed £535 
million in launch aid to bankroll projects incapable of securing commercial funding. 
Collaboration with government was expanded in 2013 through the Aerospace 
Technology Institute which by 2026 will distribute £3.9billion of funding jointly supplied 
by government and firms for research to secure the global competitive position of the 
industry. In the automotive industry the Blair government made £6.5million of public 
money available to cover MG Rover’s wage bill to finesse its acquisition by Nanking 
Automobile group. The financial crisis saw support ramped up. In 2009 the Brown 
government inaugurated a £300 million car scrappage scheme to subsidise vehicle 
purchases. In the same year, the Automotive Council, a joint government-industry forum, 
was created. In 2013 the Council formed the Advanced Propulsion Centre to dispense 
joint funding of £1 billion to promote the UK leadership in low carbon technologies. 
Construction was another sector where state patronage crowded consumers in to the UK 
property market. By 2016/17 the ‘Help to Buy’ scheme unveiled in Osborne’s 2013 
budget had subsidised home buyers to the tune of £19 billion. New sectors, such as 
renewable energy, were also identified for assistance. The Brown government found 
£60million in its 2010 budget to support the manufacture of wind turbines, but it was the 
subsidies provided under the coalition’s electricity market reform that turbocharged the 
offshore wind industry. By reducing exposure to volatile wholesale prices subsidies, 
worth up to £120 per megawatt hour, protected future revenue streams by insulated the 
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industry from volatile market prices. May’s industrial strategy admits that the UK’s 
ability to build the world’s largest offshore wind capacity rested on ‘tailored public 
support’.10 
The post-Thatcher governments’ efforts to rejuvenate manufacturing industry pale 
into insignificance when compared to those to maintain the City’s standing as a global 
financial centre. The Major governments continued to support the City’s growth through 
beneficent infrastructure investments such as the Jubilee Line extension to Canary Wharf 
but it was New Labour that placed support for the City on steroids. A brand-new 
supervisor, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), was built from scratch with a 
mandate to promote as well as regulate the financial service industry. When the global 
financial crisis made evident that the FSA’s ‘light touch’ regulation engendered greed 
and malfeasance, the Brown government orchestrated a recapitalisation package worth, at 
its peak, £1.162trillion. 
Predictably, these policies hastened the pace of deindustrialisation. Between 1990 
and 2016 manufacturing employment plunged by 2.262 million, the value added by UK 
manufacturing dropped from 16.704% to 9.015% of GDP and manufacturing’s share of 
national output fell in half. By 2016 manufacturing output was only fractionally higher 
than 1996 and the deficit in trade in goods as a percentage of GDP had widened to its 
highest levels since records began in 1948.
11
  
May’s New Industrial Strategy 
In her speech on the 11
th
 July 2016, at the beginning of her national campaign to become 
leader of the Conservative party and Prime Minister, Theresa May asserted that a future 
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government under her leadership would implement a ‘proper industrial strategy to get the 
whole economy firing’.12 The turn to industrial policy from a politician that previously 
espoused few deep-seated views about the economy was greeted with a mixture of 
suspicion, surprise and, from those anxious about imbalances in the British economic 
growth model, guarded acclaim. Upon taking office May allayed accusations of 
gimmickry by initiating changes in the machinery of government, including the creation 
of a new Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and a new 
Cabinet Committee on Economy and Industrial Strategy chaired by the Prime Minister. 
In January 2017, a consultation process began following the publication of a Green 
Paper, Building Our Industrial Strategy.  
Ten months later a White Paper, Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain fit for the 
future, appeared. Shaped by more than 2000 formal responses, the White Paper’s 
ambitious vision is for the UK to become the ‘world’s most innovative economy......[and] 
the best place to start and grow a business’ whilst delivering ‘a major upgrade to the 
UK’s infrastructure.....good jobs and greater earning power for all.....[and] prosperous 
communities across the UK’.13 The White Paper pinpoints four ‘Grand Challenges’, each 
forecast to revolutionise industries which the UK had potential to be a global leader with 
appropriate cooperation between government, business, civil society and academia. These 
challenges are artificial intelligence and the data economy, clean growth, the future of 
mobility, and meeting the needs of an ageing society.  
Compared with its predecessors the White Paper is more candid about the limits 
of markets and the potential of governments to foster progressive economic and social 
change. The Prime Minister’s foreword to the document asserts that the industrial 
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strategy ‘epitomises my belief in a strong and strategic state that intervenes decisively 
wherever it can make a difference’.14 The White Paper also endorses a role for the state 
that extends far beyond the usual emphasis on the promotion of competition and the 
correction of market failure. In particular, the strategy recognises that the long-term and 
risky nature of investment poses an appreciable obstacle to private actors installing new, 
or boosting existing, industrial capacity. In contrast governments ‘can make long-term 
investment that no single commercial or academic player can take alone. The modern 
nation state is the most powerful means we have of pooling risk’. The new industrial 
strategy accepts that risk taking is not exclusive to entrepreneurs but is a legitimate 
venture for the government which must be prepared ‘to take these risks, which means 
accepting not all will work out successfully. An industrial strategy that avoids risk is no 
industrial strategy at all’.15  
The White Paper challenges other nostrums associated with Thatcherite economic 
thinking. Whereas the Thatcherites believe markets emerge spontaneously to enable the 
exchange of goods and services the new industrial strategy foresees an active role for the 
state in building markets or, in its words, ‘explore opportunities to work with UK 
businesses to encourage emerging consumer markets’.16 Correspondingly the document 
rejects the idea that state intervention automatically crowds out private investment. Quite 
the reverse: it crowds it in. The discussion of clean growth for example calls for 
‘measures to build a market for energy efficiency among homeowners. This will 
incentivise greater private investment in household and commercial building energy 
efficiency’.17 Research and development is also cited ‘as an example of public spending 
stimulating rather than displacing private spending’.18 
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 The White Paper’s penchant for selective government intervention however does 
not augur a fundamental overhaul of the state-market relationship. In most respects, the 
novelties of Theresa May’s industrial strategy are more superficial than they first appear. 
As this article has already demonstrated, throughout the last 40 years selective industrial 
policies have remained integral to economic management. Moreover, the industries 
touted for the bulk of support under the new industrial strategy bear an uncanny 
resemblance to those receiving past state patronage. One of the strategy’s flagship 
proposals is the launch of ‘Sector Deals’, alliances between government and industry to 
nourish sectors of strategic value and lift their productivity. Of the five sector deals 
concluded to date with the life sciences, construction, automotive, creative industries and 
artificial intelligence sectors only the last is a truly a fresh initiative. Although it is not the 
subject of a Sector Deal, another industry systematically favoured in the past for which 
government support is reaffirmed in the White Paper is aerospace. Since 2010 the UK’s 
efforts to capture a larger share of the global civil aviation market have been underpinned 
by government and industry collaboration in the form of the Aerospace Growth 
Partnership. The strategy proclaims the government’s commitment to research and 
development in this industry, most notably through the Aerospace Technology Institute 
and a 2016 pledge of £365 million to fund new aerospace technologies. Designed to 
leaven the confidence of aerospace firms to make long-term commitments, these schemes 
provide another example of public money crowding in private investment.  
This overwhelming focus on a handful of industries means the new industrial 
strategy is unlikely to be a harbinger of a UK manufacturing renaissance. In reality, as it 
is presently constituted, the strategy may further narrow the UK’s manufacturing base. 
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The White Paper speaks approvingly of the German and Japanese industrial strategies but 
differs from them in fundamental ways. Prominent is its focus on deepening the 
competitive advantage of industries that are already, to use its phrase, ‘world leading’ 
rather than attempting to broaden the range of competitive UK industries. For instance in 
the discussion of the artificial intelligence and data revolution the White Paper remarks 
‘[w]e start from a position of strength. The UK is already a world leader in AI’.19 This is 
corroborated by rising venture capital investments into the UK’s artificial intelligence 
industry which grew from £6 million in 2010 to £152 million in 2016.  
Similarly whereas a minority of well-established sectors are set to benefit 
handsomely from government munificence the majority of the manufacturing sector will 
be left to fend for itself. Typifying the inconsistencies and contradictions of UK industrial 
policy since the 1970s the White Paper’s enthusiasm for selective intervention is 
tempered by a desire to indicate fidelity to the free market. Having already nominated 
sectors worthy of special treatment the new industrial strategy still insists ‘the role of 
government is not to pick favourites and subsidise and protect them’. The government’s 
task ‘is to ensure that the British business environment is shaped by competition and 
contestability in which the best businesses of all sizes can thrive’.20 In a further nod to 
free markets the White Paper proceeds to suggest that ‘competition, open financial 
markets, and the profit motive are the foundations of the success of the UK. The best way 
to improve productivity is to increase exposure to competition’.21 The message is clear. 
The role of the state is to expose those sectors not chosen for special treatment by 
government to the rigour of international competition regardless of the fairness of the 
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competition they may face. As before, the new strategy combines selective industrial 
policy for the few with functional industrial policy for the many.   
 Nowhere is this better illustrated than the financial services industry. Aside from a 
passing reference to ‘the UK’s global leadership in green finance’22 the White Paper 
barely refers to the financial services sector. Yet, enormous state support for financial 
services persists. The latest data from the National Audit Office shows that in March 
2017 the total support outstanding from the UK government to banks stood at £58bn
23
, a 
level of financial assistance appreciably higher than that offered to all other sectors 
combined in May’s industrial strategy. Assisting the City of London’s companies to tap 
new markets remains central to the missions of the Treasury and the Bank of England. In 
March 2018 a Fintech Sector Strategy was introduced.  This includes a commitment by 
the Treasury and the Department for International Trade to invest resources to help 
Fintech firms to expand into foreign markets. Curiously, although it references the White 
Paper, the Fintech Sector Strategy it is authored by the Treasury and is not mentioned on 
the BEIS website. This development can perhaps be interpreted as a further sign of the 
Treasury’s reluctance to relinquish control of industrial policy and the likely sustenance 
of strategies that reinforce the UK economy’s reliance on financial services.     
 
Conclusion 
 In the aftermath of Brexit industrial policy has been rehabilitated as a plausible 
remedy to the UK’s broken model of economic growth. As well as becoming one of the 
cornerstones of the May government’s economic agenda the devolved governments of 
Northern Ireland and Scotland now possess their own strategies for industry. A flurry of 
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reports by academics and think tanks including the Industrial Strategy Commission, the 
Institute for Public Policy Research, and Policy Exchange have accompanied these 
developments.  
 Conventional wisdom submits that Margaret Thatcher’s ascent to the premiership 
meant the extinction of UK industrial strategy. To be more precise industrial policy no 
longer inhered in selective interventions to tweak the structure of economic activity 
towards favoured sectors but in the application of mechanisms designed to buttress the 
operation of markets and cultivate a business friendly environment. In reality, and despite 
their reluctance to confess it, every government of the past 40 years has pursued a 
selective industrial strategy. Indeed Theresa May’s proposed industrial strategy sustains 
the centuries old practice of UK governments of using state support to protect or develop 
selected sectors of the economy. The collapse of the manufacturing sector and the 
phoenix like rise of the financial services industry reflect patterns of state support as 
much as the interplay of free individuals in the marketplace. When it comes to industrial 
policy recent UK governments exhibit a split personality whereby eulogies for free 
markets are fused with picking winners, saving losers and funnelling sometimes 
surreptitious subsidies to privileged companies and sectors. 
 These anomalies suffuse the new industrial strategy implying that it is unlikely to 
the be a precursor to sweeping changes in the UK’s state-market relationship . By openly 
expressing doubts about the market’s propensity to deliver a strong, equitable and 
balanced economy the new industrial strategy is tackling an important taboo. It is also 
conceived as a living document that will evolve to encompass additional challenges and 
extend Sector Deals to any industry with a strong business case and united by strong 
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leadership. Equally, especially in the short-term, there are strong reasons to suppose the 
status quo will survive. Brexit provides an inauspicious backdrop for the new industrial 
policy. Theresa May’s faith in government intervention is not widely shared by her party. 
Worse, some of the arch Brexiteers keeping her in a gilded cage in 10 Downing Street, 
are amongst the most zealous exponents of the free market religion. One week before the 
publication of the Green Paper, May threatened the EU with a race to the bottom in tax 
and regulation.
24
 Negotiating tactic with the EU or not, the May government’s industrial 
strategy is unlikely to redress the economic imbalances and grievances that drove people 
of the UK to vote leave on the 23
rd
 June 2016 .  
. 
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